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COMMENTS
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND FEDERALISM:
THE COURT INSIDE THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR
I.

INTRODUCTION

Alexander Hamilton characterized the federal judiciary as having
''no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of
the strength or wealth of society."' In the years since the landmark
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' however, federal courts
have taken an increasingly active role in controlling the use of
resources in school districts where de jure segregation has been found
to exist. In examining facts which are more legislative than
adjudicative in nature,3 the courts have often shaped relief which
intervenes in the functions of an elected body of officials, in some
cases involving the court or its appointed special master in the day to
day operation of the school.'
This judicial activism has not been limited to schools. Federal
court orders have controlled the operations of prisons, 5 police depart1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (1976).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Brown I. In Brown I, the Supreme
Court overruled the long standing "separate but equal" doctrine announced by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198 (1850) and
adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896). The Court held that separate schools for different races were inherently
unequal, based in part on the psychological impact on the minority children caused by
segregation. For an excellent history of the Brown case, see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE (1975).

3. See notes 107-114 and accompanying text infra. Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis has advanced a theory which basically establishes two types of facts which may
be considered by an administrative agency or of which a court may take notice.
Legislative facts deal with broad questions of law and social policy which often surround the case before a court in a civil rights action. Adjudicative facts are the traditional facts to which the law is applied in a case. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L.
REV. 945, 952 (1955). For a discussion of how this factual dichotomy works in public
law litigation see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
4. In the Boston school desegregation case, the judge ordered that he would personally review which teachers the school district would lay off to solve its financial
problems. See The Boston Globe, Mar. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 5, cited in Cox, The New
Dimensions of Constitutional Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REV. 791 (1976). See also

the discussion of the Cleveland case, notes 79 to 91 and accompanying text infra.
5. Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977); Rhem v. Malcom,
432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976),

aff'd in part sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd,
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ments, 6 and state mental health systems. 7 These decrees can be
incredibly detailed; the order enforcing the judgment in Wyatt v.
Stickney even specifies the temperature of the hot water supply in
Alabama's mental health facilities. 8
The propriety of such relief, and particularly the degree to which
federal equitable relief may intrude into what have traditionally been
locally controlled activities, has recently been called into question. By
combining the traditional limitations of equity jurisprudence with
notions of federalism, the Supreme Court has established a delimiting
doctrine for the lower federal courts when they exercise equity jurisdiction in civil rights cases. This comment will examine the growth of
equitable relief in school desegregation cases and the impact which this
limiting doctrine has had. 9 The propriety of using the federal/state
relationship as a guide for relief where a violation of the Constitution
has been found to exist will also be analyzed.'"

II.
A.

THE STATUS OF REMEDIAL ORDERS

The ProperMeasure of Relief

After its ruling in Brown I that separate schools are unequal," the
Supreme Court turned its attention to fashioning a remedy for the
wrong.'I In Brown II the Court directed that the lower federal court
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). These courts have held that the conditions in prison
systems which were called into question were violative of the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
6. Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability & Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976) (hereinafter cited as COPPAR v. Rizzo).
7. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala.), hearing on standards
ordered 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. 344 F. Supp. at 382 (110* F. for residential use, 180 0 F. for dishwashing and
laundry use).
9. See section II infra.
10. See section III infra.
11. See note 2 supra.
12. After ruling on liability in Brown I, the Supreme Court requested further
arguments on questions which had been previously propounded by the Court at the
end of its 1952 term, under Chief Justice Vinson:
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by
normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective
gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a
system not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/6
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which originally heard the cases' 3 should fashion the appropriate
remedies "[b]ecause of their proximity to local conditions, and the
possible need for further hearings.""' This was done to allow the
courts to monitor the action of local school officials and determine
whether the local authorities were, in good faith, implementing the
governing constitutional principles.'I Further monitoring was required
because the Court placed the burden for desegregating the schools on
local authorities. "School authorities have the primary responsibility
for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems ... .
In fashioning their orders, the lower courts were to be guided by
equitable principles.' 7 The Court was concerned with the individual
problems which would arise at the lower level, and felt that the "practical flexibility [of equity] in shaping its remedies" would minimize
delays and allow the lower court to overcome obstacles which might
arise in the desegregation of schools.' 8 Although it emphasized equity's
flexibility in balancing private and public interests, the Court stressed
that "the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed
9
to yield simply because of disagreement with them.'
Given this broad language, 20 the district courts began implementing desegregation plans, often in the face of strong resistance from
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b)
(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view
to recommending specific terms for such decrees;
(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions
to frame decrees.in these cases, and if so what general directions should the
decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first
instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 n.2 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Brown II].
13. Decided with Brown H were Briggs v. Elliott (South Carolina); Davis v.
County School Board (Virginia); and Gebhart v. Belton (Delaware). See also Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the schools of the District of Columbia were
illegally segregated in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution). In Gebhart, the Court remanded to the Supreme Court of
Delaware for further proceedings in light of the opinion in Brown H.
14. 349 U.S. at 299.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id at 300.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. While the Court's language is broad, the purpose in not using more specific
language seems to have been the same as the purpose in requiring the lower courts to
fashion the relief in equity; i.e., there was lack of certainty about the impact of the
decision at the lower court level.
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local and state authorities. 2 ' For example, in Griffin v. County School
Board,2" the district court was faced with a school board which had
closed the entire school system rather than allow the schools to be
desegregated. The district court had ordered the school board to exercise its power to levy taxes and generate revenue to reopen the schools,
and this order was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The Court said the
orders were necessary if the lower court was "to assure these petitioners their constitutional rights would no longer be denied them." 2 3
Additionally, the lower courts had to deal at length with various
desegregation plans offered by local authorities, most of which failed
to pass constitutional muster.2" In Green v. County School Board,2"
the Supreme Court held that a "freedom of choice" plan, which
allowed students to voluntarily transfer throughout the school district,
was insufficient to meet the school board's duty to create a unitary
school system.2" After three years in operation, the plan had left the
schools racially identifiable, with 85% of the black students attending
an all-black school.2 7 The Court held that the school board could not
transfer its duty to the parents and students of the school system, and
required the board to form a new plan which would succeed in
28
dismantling the dual school system.

The main thrust of decisions like Griffin, and particularly Green,
centered around the powers available to a court if local officials failed
21. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), the Court responded forcefully to
the recalcitrance of state officials in effectuating the mandate of Brown L Based on the
supremacy clause of the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), the unanimous opinion stated in extensive dicta that the "interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law
of the land .... Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly
commited by oath taken pursuant to Article VI, cl. 3, 'to support this Constitution.'"
See also Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960).
22. 377 U.S. 218 (1964). This was one of the cases originally decided in Brown I.
23. Id. at 234.
24. See, e.g., Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (striking down minority to majority transfer plans).
25. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Green marks a major shift in the Court's focus in
desegregation cases, moving from an attitudinal analysis to an empirical one, based on
the racial breakdown of the school district. The district court was placed under an
obligation to determine "the effectiveness of a proposed plan in achieving desegregation." Id. at 439. If the school board failed to offer a plan which provided "meaningful and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation," the
court was required to weigh the situation "in light of any alternatives which may be
shown as feasible and more promising in their effectiveness." Id. Further, the district
court was required to evaluate whatever plan was adopted in practice, to insure "that
state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." Id.
26. Id. at 441.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 441-42.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/6
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to implement a satisfactory desegregation plan in response to a court's
order. The burden was on school officials to offer a plan which
"promised to work." 2 9 But the district court retained jurisdiction over
the case and was required to assure the plan would eliminate racial
separation "root and branch." 3 0
The district court, therefore, could only act when the local
authorities failed in their affirmative duty to desegregate. If such
failure occurred, the burden shifted to the court to use its equity
powers to mold a proper remedy. The impatience of the Supreme
Court with the dilatory tactics of local officials was clear. In Griffin,
the Court stated that "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run
out. ....
31 In Green the burden was placed on a school board to
"come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." 3 2 Thus while the district courts
were urged to weigh circumstances "and the options available in each
instance," 33 they were clearly expected to ensure enforcement of the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
B.

The Current Supreme Court Approach

In recent years, the Court has chosen to concentrate on defining
the limits of federal equity power. While limits have .always existed, 3 '
the earlier cases were concerned with an affirmative duty to
desegregate. The recent decisions have concentrated on the nature of
the constitutional violation, the relationship of that violation to the
remedy ordered, and the relationship of the remedy to the powers of
the local authorities.3 5
29.
30.

Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. at 439.
Id. at 438.

31.
32.

Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. at 234.
391 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in original).

33. Id.
34. Brown IIand its progeny require the judge to balance state and private interests in formulating a remedy, thus implying that at some point the need to
desegregate might be overcome by a valid state interest.
35. It is difficult to speculate why the shift away from concern with the need for a
remedy occurred. Initially, the politically oriented observer will note that major
changes in Court personnel and the conservative viewpoint of the new appointees affected the direction of the Court. A second possible reason for the shift is the Court's
decision in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). While the desegregation
of southern schools involved dual school systems mandated by statute, Keyes estab-

lished that the acts of local officials absent a statutory enactment, could constitute de
jure segregation. Without a clear statutory structure to dismantle, the appearance of
intrusiveness by the lower courts increased, and it is possible the Court was reacting to

a perceived threat of overactive lower courts. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Goldstein, A Swann Song for
Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.C.L.L. REV. 1 (1978).
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The trend first appeared in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenbergBoard
6
of Education."
The district court found that a dual school system
existed and had approved a desegregation plan based on geographic
zoning with a free transfer provision."' After the Court's decision in
Green, the plaintiff moved for further relief, based on the inadequacy
of the plan then in force. The district court ordered the board to come
forward with a new plan. Upon review, the plan was deemed unacceptable, and the court appointed a special master to draw up another plan
which was placed in effect and in which the school board acquiesced.3"
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, affirmed the
orders of the district court as lying within the equitable discretion of
the court.3 9 The Court reaffirmed its stand in Brown I, but
acknowledged the difficulty which the district courts had encountered
in implementing desegregation plans based on the broad language of
Brown H.40 Because of these problems, the Court felt compelled to
delineate guidelines, "however incomplete and imperfect, for the
assistance of school authorities and courts.""'
In establishing the guidelines, the Court reiterated its earlier
language in Green which had placed the burden to act on the school
authorities. Should the authorities fail in that duty, the district court
must use its equitable power to remedy the constitutional violation. 2
But the Swann Court added:
36. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). While the holding in Swann approved of a systemwide
desegregation plan, that plan was allowed only because it was held to be consistent
with the violation. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text infra.
37. Swann v. Board of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. N.C. 1965), aff'd, 369
F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
38. 402 U.S. at 8-11.
39. Id. at 22-31.
40. Id. at 14. The Chief Justice wrote that district courts were confronted with:
[t]he failure of local authorities to meet their constitutional obligations [which]
aggravated the massive problem of converting from the state-enforced discrimination of racially separate school systems. This process has been rendered more
difficult by changes since 1954 in the structure and patterns of communities, the
growth of student population, movement of families, and other changes, some of
which had marked impact on school planning, sometimes neutralizing or negating
remedial action before it was fully implemented. Rural areas accustomed for half
a century to the consolidated school systems implemented by bus transportation
could make adjustments more readily than metropolitan areas with dense and
shifting population, numerous schools, congested and complex traffic patterns.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Chief Justice cited statistics on the growth of student
population as indicative of the problems involved. From 1954 to 1969 elementary
school enrollment nationwide increased from 17,447,000 to 23,103,000 students;
secondary school enrollment in the same period grew from 11,183,000 to 20,775,000.
Id. at 14 n.6.
41. Id. at 14.
42. Id. at 15.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/6
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In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far
this remedial power extends it is important to remember that
judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges
automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are
plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority
defaults."

The Court emphasized the traditional powers of the school authorities
and stated that such powers include the power to desegregate schools
as a matter of educational policy. Thus the district court was required
to analyze the nature of the violation, and determine the scope of the
remedy based upon that analysis, while exercising care to avoid usurping local plenary powers.
In Swann the Supreme Court found that the remedy ordered by the
district court was consistent with the nature of the violation. The
Court affirmed orders requiring that certain racial ratios be used as
starting points or "goals" for the desegregation plan, as well as orders
altering attendance zones and reassigning students outside of their
neighborhoods."
Since 1971, however, the remedial equation announced in Swann
has been used in overturning court ordered desegregation plans in
several major cases. In each of these cases, the Court found that the
plan's scope exceeded the nature of the violation and, therefore,
improperly imposed on the plenary powers of local authorities.
Milliken v. Bradley45 involved an action to desegregate the Detroit
school system. The district court concluded that the official policies of
local and state government "at all levels . . . have combine[d] with
those of private organizations ...to establish and to maintain the pattern of residential segregation throughout the Detroit metropolitan
area." 4' 6 The court further determined that the school authorities of
both the city and the state were among the governmental agencies
whose actions had caused the segregation,4 7 and that both were con43.

Id. at 16.

44. Id. at 22-31. The racial goals discussed by the Court are not quotas in the
strictest sense of the word. Rather, the Court characterized the use of mathematical

ratios as "no more than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather
than an inflexible requirement" which must be met. Id. at 25.
45. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
46. Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (1971), order 345 F. Supp. 914
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
47. Id. The Detroit Board had maintained optional attendance zones within

neighborhoods undergoing racial transition, as well as drawing boundaries in such a
manner as to further segregate the schools. The State of Michigan failed to authorize
Published by eCommons, 1980
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stitutionally liable for the segregation of the Detroit schools. Thus,
while the Detroit system was ordered to submit a Detroit-only
desegregation plan, the state was ordered to submit a plan which
included the eighty-six outlying districts in the three-county
metropolitan area."
In announcing its opinion, the district court acknowledged that it
had not received proof on whether the eighty-six school districts had
committed acts of de jure segregation by drawing boundaries or other
means." Nevertheless, based on the liability of the state school board,
the court announced that the outlying school districts would be
included in the "desegregation area," 5 0 and that all the outlying
districts would be represented by only one member on the desegregation panel while the Detroit Board was represented by three
members." The court ordered that a plan be drawn up by the panel
which would "achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation to
the end that, upon implementation, no school, grade or classroom
[would] be substantially disproportionate to the overall pupil racial
composition."' 2 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the
liability portion of the district court's decision, but remanded for furrequisite funds for transportation in urban Detroit while providing the neighboring
suburban districts with full support for their transportation programs. Id. at 589. See
also 418 U.S. at 26-27. Additionally, the state was found to have impeded and delayed
integration in Detroit schools through legislation designed to create "free choice" and
"neighborhood schools" which "had as their purpose and effect the maintenance of
segregation." 338 F. Supp. at 589. See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 388.182 (1970). Finally,
the district court held that the state was vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts
of its subordinate, the Detroit Board.
48. 345 F. Supp. 914, 920 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The court subsequently allowed the outlying districts to intervene, but granted the motions subject to the following conditions:
1. No intervenor will be permitted to assert any claim or defense previously adjudicated by the court.
2. No intervenor shall reopen any question or issue which has previously been
decided by the court.
7. New intervenors are granted intervention for two principal purposes: (a) To
advise the court, by brief, of the legal propriety or impropriety of considering a
metropolitan plan; (b) To review any plan or plans for the desegregation of the socalled larger Detroit Metropolitan area, and submitting objections, modifications
or alternatives to it or them, and in accordance with the requirements of the
United States Constitution and the prior orders of this court.
418 U.S. at 731. The district court promptly gave the intervenors only seven days to
brief the question of the legal propriety of a metropolitan plan. Id.
49. 345 F. Supp. at 920.
50. Id. at 917.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 918.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/6
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ther hearings in order to give the intervenors an opportunity to be
heard regarding the scope and implementation of the remedy. 3
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court had
erred in requiring a particular racial balance contrary to principles
announced in Swann. 54 In addressing the metropolitan plan announced
by the district court, the Supreme Court stressed the need for local
control of school districts, stating that absent a finding of liability
based on segregative acts by the outlying districts, Swann would not
permit a remedy which involved those districts. 5 Such a remedy would
make the court a "de facto legislative authority, ' 5 6 and a "school
superintendant" for the entire area,57 because of the unnecessary intrusion on the plenary state and local power to establish school district
lines. Because the finding of liability was limited to the Detroit Board,
the scope of the remedy was limited by the boundaries of the Detroit
school district. 58
53.
(1974).

Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249-52 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717

54.

418 U.S. at 740.

55.

Id. at 740. Milliken may actually have limited Swann through a narrow view

57.
58.

Id. at 744.
The Court did recognize, for example, that state laws which establish school

of the facts of the case. The state school board was found liable for the segregation of
the Detroit schools. As subdivisions of the state board, the local boards of the outlying
communities might have been included in the remedy. The Supreme Court, however,
did not impute liability to the local districts, and chose, for the most part, not to address the question of the state board's liability. See note 58 infra.
56. Id. at 743-44.
boundary lines may come in conflict with constitutional principles. Under such circumstances, the remedy prescribed may disregard the lines. The Court required,

however, that "it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local
school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation." (emphasis added). Id. at 745. Cf. United States v. Board of

School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Ind. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir.
1976), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977), on remand, 573 F.2d 400 (7th
Cir.), on remand, 456 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ind. 1978). The district court in the Indiana
case found that a state statute, which created a metropolitan form of government for
Indianapolis and its outlying counties but excluded school districts from consolidation,
was enacted with sufficient discriminatory purpose to justify a metropolitan remedy.
See also Rosenbaum & Gale, Interdistrict Relieffor Segregated Schooling in California: The Constitution Crosses the District Line, 7 SAN. FERN. V. L. REV. 117 (1979)
(edited version of an amicus brief submitted by the authors as lawyers for minority
children in a Los Angeles school desegregation case).
Vigorously dissenting in Milliken, Justice Marshall chastised the majority for taking
"a giant step backwards" in the process of reaching the goals pronounced in Brown 1,
and for attempting to find in the simple equation announced in Swann the answers to
the complex questions of school desegregation. Rather than focus on the nature of the
violation, Marshall would have the Court establish a remedy which cures the violation.
418 U.S. at 782, 806-07.
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Two years later, again relying on its holding in Swann, the Court
rejected the lower court's desegregation plan in PasadenaCity Board
of Education v. Spangler.59 In 1970, the District Court for the Central
District of California had ordered the implementation of the
"Pasadena Plan" to establish a racially neutral system of student
assignment in that city's school system."0 After initially complying with
the plan, 6 ' the board requested that the court dissolve the implementing injunction. The district court denied the motion, stating that it
would retain jurisdiction and require annual readjustment of the attendance zones in order to prevent more than 50°o of the student body at
any school from being composed of minority students. 2
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no "substantive constitutional right [to a] particular degree of racial balance or mixture." 3 and
that "having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in
order to remedy the perceived constitutional violation on the part of the
defendants, the district court had fully performed its functions of providing the appropriate remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns." ' 6 Having performed its function, continued enforcement of the order exceeded the district court's authority, and, by
implication, caused the court to interfere with powers otherwise reserved for local authorities.
Finally, in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,6' 5 the
Supreme Court did not specifically rely on Swann, but used a similar
rationale to reverse a desegregation plan implemented by the district
court. After briefly reviewing the history of the case, 6 6 Justice Rehnquist wrote:
59. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). This case, as well as other California cases, is highlighted
in Ninth Circuit Review, The History of School Desegregation in the Ninth Circuit, 12
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 481 (1979).
60. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
61. There was apparently some confusion about the extent to which the board
had complied with an order that there not be a majority of any minority in any
Pasadena public school. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 519 F.2d 430 (9th
Cir. 1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). After literally complying during the first year,
performance in subsequent years declined, and, eventually, there was general recognition that the board had "slipped out of complaince." Id. at 433 n.3. For the purpose
of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, however, the parties stipulated that
there had been no violations of the plan up to and including the time of the hearing.
427 U.S. at 432.
62. 375 F. Supp. 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975),
vacated, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
63. 427 U.S. at 434.
64. Id. at 436-37.
65. 433 U.S. 406 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dayton I].
66. The Dayton case has a long and complex procedural history, most of which is
not pertinent to the discussion at hand. For a review of the case from its inception
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/6
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There is no doubt that federal courts have authority to grant appropriate relief of this sort when constitutional violations on the
part of school officials are proved . . . But our cases have just as
firmly recognized that local autonomy of school district is a vital
national tradition . . . . It is for this reason that the case for
displacement of the local authorities by a federal court in a school
desegregation case must be satisfactorily established by factual
67
proof and justified by a reasoned statement of legal principles.
The Court then proceeded with a review of the facts. The district court
had found that the school board had operated racially imbalanced
schools and optional attendance zones, which, combined with other
board actions created a "cumulative violation" of the equal protection
clause.6 8 The Supreme Court found this phrase to be ambiguous, and
that the facts did not warrant a finding of systemwide segregation.
Therefore, under Swann, the systemwide remedy ordered was not
justified by the nature of the violations . 6

The case was remanded to

the district court for further factual findings and conclusions of law
consistent with the Supreme Court's findings in Washington v.
Davis,'7 and to have a remedy fashioned "in light of the rule laid down
through the first Supreme Court review, see Comment, From Denver to Dayton: The
Evolution of ConstitutionalDoctrine in Northern School Desegregation Litigation, 3
U. DAY. L. REV. 115 (1978). The judgment in Dayton I was by a unanimous court,
with Justices Stevens and Brennan filing separate concurrences. Justice Marshall did
not participate. 433 U.S. 406. For a discussion of further review of the Dayton case,
see note 71 and accompanying text infra.
67. 433 U.S. at 410 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 413.
69. Id. at 413-14. The district court had originally proposed a plan which included
requirements that optional attendance zones be dropped, and that faculty hiring practices be revised to achieve proper racial distribution in the schools. Additionally, the
district court ordered a "freedom of enrollment priorities" plan which allowed
students to pick their school, and provided for a random selection from those wishing
to attend a particular school, as well as requiring board furnished transportation for all
students choosing to attend a school outside their neighborhood attendance area.
Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. 72-137 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 7, 1973). On two separate occasions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the findings
and order of the district court, and on both occasions remanded the case with instructions to institute a systemwide remedy. See Brinkman v. Gilligan, 503 F.2d 684 (6th
Cir. 1974); 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1975). After the second remand, the district court
reluctantly reached the conclusion that massive transportation of students was required
to desegregate the Dayton system. Brinkman v. Gilligan, No. C-3-75-304, slip op. at 2
(S.D. Ohio, Dec. 29, 1975). The Supreme Court observed that "the District Court
would have been insensitive indeed to the nuances of the repeated reversals of its
orders . . .had it not reached this conclusion." 433 U.S. at 418.
70. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court's decision in Davis was an attempt to clarify
the relationship between discriminatory acts and segregative effect. Justice White,
writing for the majority, enunciated a test which required a finding that the acts of the

Published by eCommons, 1980

88

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 5:1

in Swann.""1
With the decision in Dayton I, the Court had fully and clearly
enunciated the limiting principle on the power of a federal court to
state agency had been motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, and that these
acts had caused the segregation in question. In other words, proof only of differential
impact which had a segregative effect was insufficient to prove a constitutional violation. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (in which the Court suggested examples of various types of proof which plaintiffs may offer to show discriminatory purpose).
In adopting the Davis standard for school cases, the Court reaffirmed its stand in
Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973), that to differentiate defacto segregation
from de jure, purpose must be shown. Keyes allowed, however, for a court to infer
purpose where the board had consistently acted in a racially neutral manner, but was
aware of the segregative impact of its actions. Id. at 207-08. The language of the Court
in Davis does not seem to allow the lower court to speculate on what knowledge the
acting body may have had at the time the action was taken. Davis also may have effectively destroyed the "Keyes presumption" that a finding of intentional segregative
intent in a "meaningful portion of the school system" establishes "a prima facie case
of unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities and shifts to those
authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are
not also the result of intentionally segregative actions." Id. at 208.
More recently, however, in the Supreme Court's second hearing of the Dayton case,
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Dayton
II] (heard in conjunction with Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941
(1979)), the Court announced a standard which seemed to reaffirm Keyes, and which
one early commentator argues may go beyond Keyes, placing an impossible burden on
school authorities. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(9th ed. Supp. 1979). In Columbus, Justice White, writing for the seven to two majority, acknowledged and affirmed the previous desegregation cases. He wrote at length,
however, about the need for deference to the trial court's finding of fact, which
previously had not been a stated concern of the Court. Secondly, he upheld the lower
court's ruling that the board had a continuing affirmative constitutional duty to
desegregate the school system, and that this duty had existed in 1954, after the decision
in Brown I. Because the board had failed to remedy the dual system at that time, it had
ignored the adequate notice which it had been given, and could now be held responsible for the foreseeable consequences of that failure. 99 S. Ct. at 2948-49.
The Court also held that the district court had correctly applied the Davis test in that
it had found "actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact," and that
these intentional actions showed segregative purpose. Id. at 2950. By introducing a
"foreseeable effects standard" for the lower courts to use in their determinations,
while at the same time stressing the importance of the trial court's findings of fact,
Columbus may go beyond Keyes in allowing the court to speculate regarding the purpose of past acts which have a segregative impact.
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Columbus, arguing that by building presumption on
top of presumption the majority had effectively destroyed any distinction between de
facto and de jure segregation.
Columbus leaves many open questions for the Court. Does it effectively overrule
Davis? May it be extended to other areas of equal protection law, or does the Brown
affirmative duty only extend to school systems? So far as remedies are concerned,
however, if the district courts can use Columbus to discover a systemwide violation,
then the limitations of Swann and its progeny on equitable relief will be erased, and a
systemwide remedy will be appropriate. But see text accompanying notes 89-91 infra.
71. 433 U.S. at 419. Dayton II, 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979), dealt by and large with the
nature of the violation without addressing the question of the scope of the remedy.
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establish an equitable remedy in a desegregation case, which the Court
had first raised in Swann. A federal court must define the nature of the
constitutional violation which it has found and shape the remedy so its
scope does not exceed the scope of the violation. The purpose of this
analysis is to avoid unnecessary intrusion into plenary state powers.
The Court has established that local control of the schools is a "vital
national tradition,

' 72

which the lower federal courts must properly

respect. It can be argued that no court has the power to issue orders
beyond the controversy presented to it, and thus the Court has injected
an unnecessary element into the equation by raising federalism concerns. But the more recent decisions of the Supreme Court consistently
grant those concerns an increasingly important role, both in school
cases specifically, and constitutional jurisprudence in general. 73
C. The District Courts

-

Life in the Fast Lane

The express purpose of the Chief Justice in detailing the analysis in
Swann was to assist school authorities and courts in shaping remedies
where a segregated school system was found to exist. The lower courts
have continued to "grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of the
day-to-day implementation ' 7 of the commands of Brown I and
Brown II. In doing so, the remedies formed have been limited only by
the imagination of the courts, the school boards, the Plaintiffs, and the
special masters which the courts invariably appoint to aid in their
determinations.
In Boston, the district court placed the South Boston High School
into a receivership because of the strenuous objections which parents
had voiced to forced busing of students, and the violence which had
erupted in that particular school. 7 While this form of relief is not
without precedent, 76 the First Circuit, in affirming the order, said that
Unlike Columbus, in which the decision of the trial court was given great weight by the
Supreme Court, see note 70 supra, Dayton II upheld the court of appeals, which had
overruled some of the trial court's finding of fact as clearly erroneous and imposed the
affirmative duty to desegregate after Brown I on the Dayton board. 583 F.2d at 247.
The failure to meet this duty, and the continued maintenance of a dual system was a
violation which could properly be met with a systemwide remedy. 99 S. Ct. at 2980-81.
72. 433 U.S. at 410.
73. The Burger Court has shown an increasing concern for federal/state relationships in the areas of criminal procedure, and in areas where federal judicial power interacts with state or local government. See notes 99-110 and accompanying text infra.
74. Swann v. Charlott-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
75. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1042 (1977). See Roberts, The Extent of FederalJudicialPower: Receivership of South
Boston High School, 12 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 55 (1976).
76. At the turn of the century, judges used receiverships to reorganize the railroad
companies. See Note, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 571 (1933); Note, Receivership as a Remedy
in Civil Rights
Cases, 24 RUTG.
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only the extraordianry circumstances present in Boston warranted the
substitution of a court appointed official for an official holding office
through normal elective procedures. 7 7 The court also noted that the
receiver was an assistant superintendant of the school system, a factor
which the appeals court felt would help minimize the intrusion into
local school powers. 8
A court also interfered with traditionally local powers in
Cleveland. The school system in that city, while operating under a
federal court order to desegregate, 9 found that it would be unable to
pay certain debenture bonds which would come due at the end of 1977
if it continued to pay normal operating costs. Because of the statutory
provisions controlling Ohio school financing, the Cleveland schools
80
would have been forced to close rather than default on the bonds.
Because closing the schools would prevent implementation of the
ordered desegregation plan, the district court ordered that the schools
stay open, joined the creditor banks and county auditor as defendants
in the case, and enjoined the banks from seeking payment of the
debt." In a memorandum suppporting the order, the court cited 28
U.S.C. section 2283 as specific authority for a federal court to issue an
injunction to maintain its jurisdiction and supervise its orders. On appeal, 2 the order was vacated and the case was remanded for a full
77. 540 F.2d at 535. Beyond the considerations of parent objections and violence,
the school committee in Boston had shown purposeful intransigence in implementing
court ordered desegregation, causing District Judge McGarrity to comment, "On the
basis of the history of these proceedings, the court can expect no assistance from the
school committee as presently constituted." Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 72-911, slip op.
at 23 (D.C. Mass., Dec. 9, 1975).
78. 540 F.2d at 527.
79. Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
80. Under section 3313.483 of the Ohio Revised Code, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3313.483 (Page Supp. 1978), a school system which is faced with a year-end deficit
must request an audit by the state, which will certify if the system has exhausted its
operating funds and is required to close. This is done to insure payment of debts, since
Ohio requires that government bonds be paid at maturity, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5705.03 (Page Supp. 1978), and the Ohio Constitution requires governmental subdivisions to reserve funds for the payment of debts prior to paying current operating expenses, OHIO CONST. art. XII, § 11. Failure to pay the debt at its date of maturity
precludes collection by the creditor. National City Bank v. Board of Educ., 52 Ohio
St. 2d 81, 86, 369 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (1977).
81. Reed v. Rhodes, No. 76-1300 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 8, 1977).
82. Initially, the order had been stayed by the court of appeals pending outcome
of a mandamus action filed by the banks to force the county auditor to pay the bonds.
The court reasoned that if the mandamus did not issue, there would be no need to
reach the federal question involved. Cf. Railroad Comm'r v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941). The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently issued the mandamus, clearing the
way for federal action. National City Bank v. Board of Educ., 52 Ohio St. 2d 81, 369
N.E.2d 1200 (1977).
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hearing below because the order had been issued without notice to all
parties.8 3 In dicta, however, the appeals court characterized school
financing as a local activity with which a federal court should not
tamper, when the financing decisions have been made without an unconstitutional purpose. Because the requirement that school systems
operate out of debt could not be shown to have been intended to further school segregation, and because there was no similar intent with
respect to the possible closing of schools, 84 the federal court was required to follow state law regarding school financing.8"
Beyond school financing, the district court in Cleveland ordered a
reorganization of the school administration, a power traditionally
reserved to the local board. The order to restructure came at the
recommendation of the special master in the case with the purpose of
easing implementation of the desegregation order.8" Once again, the
court of appeals found that the order had been given without notice to
the parties and remanded to the district court for a full hearing." The
court re-emphasized the need for local authorities to retain control
over the schools unless extraordinary circumstances existed, stating
that such circumstances did not exist on the record before it. 88
The purpose of the Supreme Court in Swann was to define
guidelines for the lower courts. In both Boston and Cleveland,
however, the trial courts did not reflect the concern of the Supreme
Court for local powers. It may be that the guidelines, and the
quanitative analysis they call for, are not useful for a court which is
primarily concerned with implementation of a desegregation plan in a
complex case. Moreover, the Cleveland case points out that the Swann
analysis may merely overlap with traditional notions of abstention and
federalism, and may be unnecessary to prevent a federal court from interfering in a state court's proceeding. 9
The appellate courts in these cases did reflect the Supreme Court's
concern for local powers, however, and may have even gone beyond
the holding of the Supreme Court in Swann. In both cases the district
court had made a finding that systemwide dejure segregation had been
caused by the official acts of school officials.9 0 Under a Swann
83.
84.

National City Bank v. Battisti, 581 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1977).
Cf. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).

85.

581 F.2d at 569.

86.
87.

Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1978).

88.
89.

Id. at 575.
See note 82 supra.

90. Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 379
F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Hennigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). The Cleveland case was taken up on ap-
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analysis, the scope of the remedy would also be systemwide. Yet the
two appeals courts, using identical language to arrive at different
results, said that only extraordinary circumstances would allow a
district court to use its equitable powers to perform traditional local
powers, even where a systemwide constitutional violation was found to
exist.
The purpose of requiring extraordinary circumstances may be an
acknowledgement of the Supreme Court's concern for federal/state
relationships, a misreading of the Court's cases, 9' or a legitimate concern by those circuit courts for federal/state comity. The rationale,
however, may further limit the powers of the district court to fashion a
remedy when a constitutional. wrong is discovered.
III.

A.

STATE POWERS AS A LIMIT TO JUDICIAL DECREES

Plenary State Powers v. The Need for a Remedy

The Cleveland and Boston cases provide a vehicle for examining
the impact of the Swann rationale in lower court cases. But that examination does not reach a major concern raised by Swann: the propriety of limiting the federal judicial power in school desegregation
cases based on deference to local powers.
Traditionally, injunctive relief was a one time proposition. The
court would issue its order after discovering the evil. After that, the
parties were expected to comply, and the chancellor would be required
to interfere only if a party requested. 92
But in Brown II, the Court specifically stated that the lower court
was to retain jurisdiction, allowing the judge to monitor school board
compliance with the order.9" Nonetheless, many of the original
desegregation orders were proscriptive in nature, instead of prescriptive."' This put the burden for desegregation on local authorities rather
than requiring the court to construct and implement a plan. It was only
peal and the implementation of the order to desegregate stayed until the Supreme
Court decided Columbus and Dayton II. Shortly after those plans were upheld, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the Cleveland case. The Cleveland School Board subsequently
announced it would petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. See 48 U.S.L.W.
3457 (petition for certiorari filed Nov. 21, 1979).
91. The "extroardinary circumstances" requirement was used in both Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), to preclude
federal injunctive relief in other factual settings. In both cases, however, some other
form of relief was available to the plaintiffs. See notes 110-113 infra.
92. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974); Chayes, supra note 3.
93. 349 U.S. at 299. See Chayes, supra note 3.
94. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976). The original
order here enjoined the school board from operating a dual school system, rather than
prescribing affirmative relief.
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when school authorities failed in this duty that the court could use its
9
extraordinary equitable powers to fashion the needed relief.
The Supreme Court's more recent approach, however, places a
limitation on that broad power by forcing the lower court to defer to
local and state authorities, even where those authorities have failed to
provide an acceptable desegregation plan, in areas where local powers
have traditionally controlled.
The power of school authorities to make policy decisions concerning the wellbeing of the school has consistently been an area in which
judicial tampering has been kept to a minimum. Two reasons are
generally advanced for restraint. First, the courts are reluctant to intrude on the academic freedom of an institution or instructor. In
96
the need for
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
academic freedom and respect for a local determination of the need for
a pluralistic student body were determined to be sufficient grounds for
establishing a racial classification.
Secondly, and more pertinent to the desegregation cases, is the
argument that the local control of schools is necessary to insure direct
control by the people over decisions which vitally affect the education
of their children. This argument has been utilized to support a local
school tax scheme which was attacked as denying equal protection to
the children in poorer districts, 9 and to deny a constitutional challenge
to corporal punishment in schools. 98
On the other hand, schools and school officials are not the only

95. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
96. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78 (1978), the Court held that adequate due process had been given to a
medical student prior to her academic dismissal from the school. The Court
distinguished academic suspension from disciplinary suspension, stating that, because
of the subjective nature and highly specialized nature of the standards used, that such
decisions were best left to the schools themselves.
97. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
Rodriguez Court upheld a school taxing scheme based on property values, which
forced the districts with lower property values to offer an inferior education or to seek
funds elsewhere. The Court refused to recognize a certain quantum of education as a
fundamental right, and held that so long as some education was provided, the state
had met its obligation to provide some educational opportunity to its children. Ohio's
scheme for school funding has recently survived a similar attack, with the Ohio
Supreme Court relying on similar reasoning. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d
368, - N.E.2d - (1979).
98. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Court explicitly deferred to
the normal processes of community debate and legislative action to decide if corporal
punishment should be used, rather than decide under the fourteenth amendment what
it considered to be a policy question. In doing so, the Court stressed that school
discipline was normally committed to the discretion of local authorities. Id. at 681-82.
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local and state concerns which have received deferential treatment
99 a
from the Supreme Court in recent years. In Younger v. Harris,
decision which set the tone for many of the Supreme Court's later rulings, it was held that federal courts should not hear suits seeking to enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution on first amendment grounds
unless there exist extraordinary circumstances which create a great and
immediate danger of irreparable loss to the criminal defendant. As in
Swann,'"' the Court tied a traditional equity requirement - the requirement of irreparable injury - to a concern for federalism, stating
that the notion of "comity"'"' was even a more vital consideration in
restraining federal courts.'° 2
Additionally, state executive functions have been brought under
this hybrid notion of equity jurisprudence and federalism. In Rizzo v.
Goode,' 3 citizens of Philadelphia brought a class action against that
city's mayor and certain police officials, under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
alleging a pattern of illegal and unconstitutional police mistreatment of
minority citizens. The district court held that such abuses had occurred
as a regular, systematic pattern and found for the plaintiffs.' 4 Under
court supervision, a plan to monitor police behavior, which was
satisfactory to both parties, was formulated.' 5 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the judgment was an unnecessary intrusion into
the discretion of the police department and city in conducting local affairs. 106 The Court stressed the lack of causal relationship between the
"isolated" action of a few police officers who were not named as parties to the action and the damages sought by the plaintiffs, and found
99. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The action was based on first amendment rights and asked
that the statute be found void as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
100. See notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
101. Justice Black, writing for the Court, defined comity as a "proper respect for
state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union
of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways." 401 U.S. at 44.
102. The Younger doctrine has now been extended to civil cases which are quasicriminal in nature, such as a civil action to abate the showing of an allegedly obscene
movie, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 420 U.S. 592 (1975), civil contempt proceedings,
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), or a civil attachment proceeding to which the state
is a party, Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977). Most recently, the Court has extended the doctrine even farther by applying Younger to a state child custody proceeding. Moore v. Sims, 99 S.Ct. 2371 (1979). Moore can be read as suggesting a requirement that a party exhaust available state remedies prior to bringing an action
against the state in federal court.
103. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
104. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
105. 357 F. Supp. at 1321.
106. 423 U.S. at 379.
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that liability had not been proven.1 0 7 Turning to the court order,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, determined that in the
absence of a constitutional violation, the district court had improperly
invoked its equitable powers.1O° Further, the Court rejected a claim
that plaintiffs were entitled to a prophylactic order to protect them
09
from unconstitutional abuses of police power.' The Court reasoned
that the exercise of federal equitable power must be restrained by the
relationship between federal and state powers, as well as the need for
1 0 Essenequity powers to be used only in extraordinary circumstances.
tially, the same concerns that had been used in Swann and Younger
were extended to protect a state executive branch.
These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court's concern for
federal/state comity goes beyond the school desegregation cases. But
an important distinction must be made between the school cases, and
cases in which other local activities were involved. In Younger and
Rizzo the Court emphasized that an alternative remedy was available
in law should injunctive relief not be granted."' Because of the nature
of the wrong outlined in Brown I, however, no equivalent remedy at
law exists for the plaintiff to pursue in segregation cases.
The mandate of Brown I was not simply to provide compensation
for past desegregation;'" 2 rather, it called for admission of black and
other minority students to the public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis." 3 While, ideally, this could best be accomplished
107. Id. at 370-77.
108. Id. at 377-80.
109. Id. In reaching its conclusion the Court relied heavily on its decision two years
earlier in O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). O'Shea involved a § 1983 action
against a magistrate and a circuit court judge for allegedly engaging in a continuing
pattern of illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury fee practices in criminal cases. The
Supreme Court, with Justice White writing, held that the claim failed to state a case or
controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution, because none of the plaintiffs alleged any real injury to himself and no statute was challenged as unconstitutional on its face. Additionally, the Court stated in dicta that even if a case or controversy had been stated, the injunctive relief sought would not be granted because it
would constitute a major restraint on the daily conduct of the courts in direct contradiction of Younger.
110. 423 U.S. at 379.
111. For example, a major thrust of the Younger doctrine is where the right
asserted cannot be vindicated through the defense of a criminal action which is pending, both in the state court and through discretionary review by the United States
Supreme Court. In the Rizzo situation, an action may be brought for injunctive relief
or compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing a federal right of
action for money damages under § 1983), or a tort action could possibly be brought
against the individual or the political subdivision which employs him. This would also
be the case in the school discipline cases.
112. It can be argued that the determination of quantum would be impossible.
113. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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by the good faith compliance of local authorities, the Court made it
clear that reluctance on the part of those authorities was insufficient
grounds to prevent enforcement of the constitutional principles.', Absent an ability to fashion broad equitable relief, the district court can
offer no remedy for the wrong if the school officials choose to hedge
or compromise their compliance. A local school board which has not
offered a constitutionally acceptable plan should not expect the same
plenary powers it has abused to provide a debilitating limit on the
remedy which the court may shape. The requirement for direct action
to implement the decision in Brown I, as mandated by Brown II and
Green, requires the court to exercise functions traditionally reserved to
local bodies.II This is done to secure the constitutional rights of the
individual against abuse by those bodies."I6
B.

The Judicial Trinity -

Legislature, Executive, and Judge

To allow a judge to make decisions which are legislative in nature,
and administer to the degree necessary the governmental unit affected
by the court order, may stretch both his effectiveness and his credibil-

ity." 7 As previously mentioned,' ' desegregation suits are not suits in
the traditional private model, involving a dispute between two
parties.'' Rather, they involve a large number of plaintiffs and
defendants, and incredibly complex fact situations.'2 0 Instead of
114. Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
115. Id. The Court in Dayton II referred to an affirmative duty to desegregate the
schools after the decision in Brown I. The reappearance of an affirmative duty theory,
after several years of focus on limitations, may mark a return to the judicial activism
of the Warren Court. The difference is that the duty is discussed in the context of
determining liability, and is based on the Court's holding in Brown I, rather than a
duty created by a specific court order to desegregate in a specific case. See discussion
and cases cited in note 71 supra.
116. See Cox, supra note 4, at 814. Professor Cox points out that the "necessary
components of any program of integrated education in a large city appear to commit
the courts to constant executive or administrative supervision of the organization,
employment practices, curriculum, and extracurricular acitivites of entire school
systems." He further states that the requisite affirmative action can only be accomplished "through voluntary cooperation of the political branches or else by the
courts themselves embarking upon programs having typically administrative, executive, and even legislative characteristics heretofore thought to make such programs
unsuited to judicial undertaking." Id.
117. Chayes, supra note 3, at 1307. The author argues that to gain the substantive
goals advanced by the Court in Brown I and other civil rights cases, there must be
created a cultural commitment to judicial oversight which restricts the latitude normally allowed state and local decision makers.
118. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
119. See Chayes, supra note 3.
120. Id. Professor Chayes attributes the number of parties to the growth of liberal
joinder and the class action rules under the new federal civil rules. See FED. R. Civ. P.
19, 23.
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standing aloof as a decisionmaker, the judge becomes involved in
determining the shape and scope of the case; likewise the remedy is not
imposed on a party, but is often negotiated by the parties and the
2
judge. '
Moreover, by making forward looking, policy oriented relief once
a constitutional violation is discovered, the court may be creating
problems of a different nature. By granting such relief, the court may
leave the citizens in that district with the sense that they have lost control over the political process. 1 2 Further, the long term effects of the
decision may not readily appear to a judge immersed in historical,
2
for example,
sociological, and demographic evidence. In Milliken,'1
the Supreme Court emphasized that by consolidating the existing
school districts, a new array of problems would arise, including the
status and authority of the present school boards, the need for the
boards to represent a defined local constituency, problems in levying
taxes and establishing equality in those taxes, as well as other financial
problems.'"" The Ohio Supreme Court, in ordering the Cleveland
school board to pay its bonds, and thereby in effect ordering the
system to close in defiance of a federal court order, emphasized that to
allow default would destroy the system's credit rating, and thereby call
into question the rating of all Ohio school bonds.' The ability to borrow money was characterized as vital to the continued operations of
the schools because of the uneven, staggered flow of revenue from tax
collection.' 2 6 It can be argued, therefore, that by attempting to keep
the schools open in the short term, the federal court had jeopardized
the long term operation of the schools in an entire state.
It must be emphasized, however, that while the problems enunciated above are cause for the federal judge to tread more cautiously
when dealing in areas of plenary state power, it is fundamental law
that the Constitution and the rights enumerated therein must supersede
competing state interests. 2 7 Thus, while these concerns may encourage
a judge to consider broader input before making a decision, they
121. Chayes, supra note 3.
122. In Cleveland, after a tax levy had been defeated, a principal in the Cleveland
school system said, "There was also the busing issue, a feeling of getting back at the
judge, and also the frustration of having no part in making judgments that affect our
lives. It is just a gut feeling, that people need to'have a say in their lives." Turpin v.
Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1978) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), citing New York
Times, Apr. 16, 1978 at 24, col. 2.
123. See notes 45-58 and accompanying text supra.
124. 418 U.S. at 743.
125. National City Bank v. Board of Educ., 52 Ohio St. 2d 81, 88, 369 N.E. 2d
1200, 1204 (1977).
126. Id.
127. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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should not prevent a court from enforcing the constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs.
A second concern that arises about the judge in these cases is that
his abilities may be taxed beyond their limit as the court becomes more
involved with the day to day operations of the school in order to implement its order.' 28 The Supreme Court has said that federal judges
are poor candidates for the position of organizing military training'29
or for the redesignation of school districts.' 3 ° Nevertheless, there are
several reasons why the technical competency of the judge should not
be a central concern in the school desegregation cases.
First, the court is required to examine complex issues in suits at law
in order to find liability and determine damages.' 3 ' In an adversary
system, it becomes the job of the advocates to educate the court in the
limited subject area embraced by the suit. 32 Thus, the system operates
on the presumption that the judge is sufficiently competent to grasp
the issues over which that court has jurisdiction. Chief Justice Warren
once offered, after his retirement, that there was "no such thing as an
expert" on the Supreme Court. Rather, the Justices are all
generalists. II
Moreover, the court is able to draw upon outside experts as
masters in the case before it,' 3 or avail itself of other outside sources
of information. These may consist of citizen committees, made up of
lay persons and experts, which take control of the institution under
order of the court,' 39 or the appointment of a sole individual to a posi128. See Cox, supra note 4, at 819; Goldstein, supra note 34, at 43-52; Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428
(1977).
129. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1972).
130. Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
131. See Goldstein, supra note 34, at 44. For example, in deciding border dispute
cases between states under its original jurisdiction, the Court is called on to decide
complicated questions of surveying and geology in determining borders between two
states. See, e.g., Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289 (1974).
132. Professor Cleary has characterized a trial as "not an inquest or investigation
but a demonstration conducted by the parties." Cleary, Presuming and Pleading:An
Essay on JuristicImmaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 7 (1959).
133. R. KRUGER, supra note 2, at 666.
134. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. The rule, in pertinent part, provides that:
[T]he court in which any action is pending may appoint a special master therein ....
The master shall prepare a report upon the matters submitted to him...
and, if required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he shall set them
forth in the report .... In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall acBefore filing his
cept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous ....
report a master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
135. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
915 (1978) (naming a "human rights committee" to monitor prison conditions).
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36
tion of authority to aid in implementing the plan.'
Finally, the court can rely on the lawyers, in their role as advocates
and the expertise of the attorneys' clients to assist it in drawing up proposed remedial plans. Some courts have had success in allowing the
3 7
parties to negotiate a plan, within the confines of the court's order.'
Although this allows the parties to control, to some degree, the outcome of the litigation, it mitigates the impact that any lack of judicial
expertise might otherwise have on the case. If the plans of the parties
are determined to be insufficient by the court, it may revert to a special
master to construct a plan. 3 '
Thus, while concerns exist about the competency of federal judges
to decide hard cases which involve what have been traditionally seen as
legislative or policy questions, and to administer their orders once
formed, the nature of the judicial process itself prevents these concerns
from controlling. A judge cannot pick which cases he will hear based
on his or someone else's evaluation of that judge's ability to understand the case; rather, he must hear the case and draw on the sources
to him and which enof information and expertise which are available
39
decision.1
informed
an
make
can
sure he
It would be a mistake, however, to focus on these concerns, and to
allow them to control the determination of a plaintiff's constitutional
rights. The concern should not be with the judge's competency to
decide "political" questions, but rather with the "board of education's
4
competence in enduring the civil rights of the school children."'

136. Reed v. Rhodes, No. 76-1300 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 7, 1978) (naming a Deputy
Superintendant for Desegregation Implementation); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp.
1141 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (naming a receiver for South Boston High
School).
137. Professor Chayes suggests that a negotiated remedy mitigates the danger of
intruding on organic powers and organic interparty relationships. Chayes, supra note
3, at 1298-99. The plan which the Supreme Court invalidated in Rizzo had been implemented after both sides had found it agreeable. 423 U.S. at 365. The city's subsequent appeal, after acquiescing in the remedy, could be construed to mean that the
agreement was designed to gain a final, appealable order rather than to show accession
to demands.
138. See, e.g., Reed v. Rhodes, 455 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1978). In Reed, the
court rejected the plans offered by the defendant school board as not meeting the duty
created by the violation. Instead, the court ordered that the special master's plan,
which involved the transportation of large numbers of students, be implemented.
139. See Cox, supra note 4, at 794.
140. Id. Professor Cox maintains that where constitutional principles are involved,
the federal courts must not defer to other powers, or shrink from their duty to decide
the case.
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Alternative Models

The school desegregation cases, and public law litigation in
general, involve extensive involvement by the courts in policy matters.
While the Supreme Court has taken the Swann approach to limit the
federal court's activism in these areas by tying traditional equity limitations to federalism concerns, other proposals have surfaced which
would also limit the power available to federal courts when dealing
with what are viewed as local powers.
Because the courts deal with political and administrative questions
in deciding these cases, a separation of powers analysis has been suggested to prevent the court from interfering.'" In varying degrees, the
proposals urge the court to weigh the state powers which are legislative
or executive in nature and defer to those powers in creating and
enforcing its order.' 4 2 This would allow local authorities an oppor141. The Supreme Court itself alluded to a separation of powers analysis in dealing
with the case of Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605
(1974), placing particular concern on the undemocratic nature of the federal courts.
The Court, however, subsequently ruled that a separation of powers analysis was not
appropriate when dealing with different levels of government in Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976). In Elrod a plurality of the Court held that a "vertical" separation of
powers analysis "has no applicability to the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States." Id. at 352. (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
A more detailed proposal has been offered in Nagel, Separation of Powers and the
Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). Professor Nagel
notes that current uses of equitable relief "raise the question whether the judiciary has
begun to tolerate in itself a blending of functions that would never be tolerated in
another branch of government," and offers that the courts should engage in an
"abstract functional differentiation" of the powers involved in a given case prior to
making a decision in that case. After the Court determines the detail in which the
decree will be given, and the range of the decree, i.e., the duration and impact, a duty
would be placed on the court to address the scope of its intrusion into the classically
defined function of the other branch and demonstrate "that it could not redress the
adjudicated violation by involving fewer third-party consequences." Id. at 712. See
also, Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a- Vis the States: The Dispensabilityof
JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977) (urging that federal action which is beyond
conventional federal authority and therefore violates "states' rights" be treated as
non-justiciable and resolution of the question left to the political branches); Chayes,
supra note 3, at 1310 (concluding that a vertical separation of powers analysis is inconsistent with the supremacy clause of the Constitution).
142. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 141, at 707-23. Professor Nagel suggests five
areas where deference should specifically be called for:
(1) Postponement of the remedy to give local authorities an opportunity to act.
(2) By engaging in an ad hoc review of the proper degree of deference to show
lack of interference with the functions of other branches.
(3) Wording the decree carefully to avoid an improper intrusion into the power
of another branch.
(4) Allowing executive authorities to appoint executive officers.
(5) Seeking cooperation of other federal branches before direct intrusions into
local power by means of a declaratory judgment.
Id. at 718-23.
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tunity to take proper measures without intrusion by the court, and
would leave the policy decisions in the hands of elected decision
makers. Unlike the "affirmative duty" approach in Brown II,
however, courts would not be permitted to intrude where a political
remedy was available.
On initial examination, the separation of powers analysis appears
more consistent with democratic principles, and would therefore be
desirable over extensive judicial (and inherently undemocratic) intrusion. But individual rights fare poorly as a rule in a majoritarian
system. Deference to state powers would leave these policy matters up
to the same political entity which has been found liable of violating the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. In the school cases, the restoration of
the rights would be left to the school board, whose inability to create a
satisfactory desegregation plan initially forces the court to invoke its
broad equity powers. '43 Additionally, several other flaws exist with a
separation of powers analysis which make it less than acceptable for
constitutional adjudication. Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution, state law must yield to federal law when they are in conflict.
Thus the analysis rests on the faulty premise that the federal courts can
be treated as equals with the branches of state governments.' 4 4
A second alternative to limit federal intrusion into state powers is
available via legislation, both on the federal and state level.' 4 Under
the Constitution, Congress may regulate the jurisdiction and powers of
the federal courts, and there has been much activity regarding the
federal courts' ability to issue remedial orders in the school cases, particularly orders which involve forced transportation of students.' 46
Beyond providing clear limits, executive and legislative action can
also remove the onus of desegregation from the courts. Legislatures can
enact reforms which make judicial intrusions unlikely by eliminating
143.

See discussion and cases cited in notes 111-16 supra.
U.S. CONST. art. VI; Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion of
Mr. Justice Brennan); see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
145. This approach would be consistent with the Choper proposal that political
questions be deferred to political bodies for resolution rather than have the court
decide them. Choper, supra note 141.
146. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 119-20
(9th ed. Supp. 1979). The Congress has had before it no less than five proposals to
limit busing. Of these, only a rider to the Appropriations Act for the Departments of
Labor and HEW has been passed into Law. See Pub. L. No. 94-439, §§ 206-08, 90
Stat. 1434 (1976). Its language did not address court jurisdiction, however, and only
limited the funds which could be spent for transportation of students from their
neighborhoods. Thus, its impact was on enforcement of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by
HEW rather than by the courts. In July 1979, the House defeated a proposed constitutional amendment, which would have made busing unconstitutional, by a vote of 216
to 209. GUNTHER, supra at 119-20.

144.
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the wrong before the suit is brought.'" This is particularly appropriate
in the cases where institutional conditions are attacked, such as in the
prison and mental health facility cases,'" where direct control over the
improvement of conditions can be exercised.
Finally, as an alternative to the Swann approach, the Supreme
Court has begun elaborating alternative measures of relief which it
feels are consistent with the nature of the remedy. After the Court
remanded the Detroit case,"4 9 the district court formulated a remedy
which did not involve extensive transportation, or metropolitan
desegregation, but focused on improving the educational skills of
minority children in the schools, and bringing those skills in parity
with the white children in the schools.' 50 The Supreme Court upheld
the plan'' as necessary to place the victims of unlawful discrimination
in the position they would have occupied had such illegal conduct not
been engaged in by local officials." 2 The Court said the remedy would
not exceed the violation where the remedy is tailored to cure the condition that offends the Constitution, and that matters in addition to student reassignment were an appropriate area in which federal courts
might act.' 3 The Court also explained its decision in Edelman v. Jordan,'" stating that prospective relief for a past wrong was
147. In discussing the tension between judicial action and legislative policy choices,
James Bradley Thayer wrote:
[Ilit
should be remembered that the exercise of [the power of judicial review], even
when unavoidable, is always attended with a serious evil, namely that the correction of legislative mistakes comes from the outside, and the people thus lost the
political experience, and the moral education and stimulus that comes from
fighting the question out in the ordinary way, and correcting their own errors.
J.THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 106-07 (1974). Professor Cox points out, however, that
the actions of the courts may be a part of this educational process, particularly where
political rights are supressed, or the "habits [are] so ingrained that their vice could be
conveniently ignored so long as the Court was silent." Cox, supra note 4, at 828-29.
148. See cases cited in note 5 supra.
149. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text supra.
150. Milliken v. Bradley, 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 229
(6th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The criteria established by the court included improvement of reading skills, in-service training for teachers, testing programs,
and counselling and career guidance for minority children. The court also ordered
minimal transportation to eliminate racially identifiable schools. Id. at 1034.
151. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
152. Id. at 281-83.
153. Id. at 287-88. In holding such remedies were acceptable, the Court relied
heavily on the prior use of similar relief by lower federal courts in school cases.
154. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court in Edelman had held that the eleventh amendment barred suit against a state to pay past disability benefits to an applicant even
where federal guidelines had not been followed. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976), however, the Court allowed retrospective monetary relief as a remedy where
the action was brought to enforce legislation enacted under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.
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distinguishable from payment of an accrued monetary liability. Prospective relief was a necessary step to insure future constitutional compliance and to "wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced
by the inherently unequal dual school system long maintained by
Detroit."' "
In approving alternative remedies for courts hearing desegregation
cases, the Supreme Court has taken advantage of the breadth of the
equitable powers available to the federal courts. On the other hand, it
can be argued that the remedies announced in Milliken II are as intrusive on state and local powers as are transportation orders. The
remedies impact directly on the availability of funds for such programs, and may still involve the court in administering the programs or
appointing masters to perform that task.
Moreover, the Court in Milliken H shifted the emphasis on integrated education, on which the Brown I Court had based its decision, to one of attempting to improve the quality of the education which
the minority students received.' 6 While this may be necessary because
of practical considerations,"' it may also mark the beginning of a
trend of disregarding the mandate of Brown I that separate is inherently unequal.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Swann, the announced purpose of the Supreme Court was to
provide guidelines for the lower courts in fashioning desegregation
remedies. It did this by stating a limitation on the equitable powers of
those courts, based on the plenary nature of school powers, and the
need for the federal courts to consider federal/state comity in formulating their desegregation orders. Milliken H, however, allowed a
remedy to stand which intruded on basic local powers to control
school curriculum and testing, and in doing so ignored one of the basic
mandates from Brown L The apparent inconsistency points to the wide
latitude which the Supreme Court has in reviewing lower court orders
when it applies the standard from Swann. In determining the scope of
the remedy based on the nature of the violation, the district court is
left with a seemingly impossible quantitative analysis, which leads to a
155. 433 U.S. at 290.
156. In Brown I the Court had stressed that even where "tangible" factors are
equal, "segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even
though the physical facilities and other 'tangible' factors may be equal, [deprives] the
children of the minority group of equal education opportunities .... " 347 U.S. at 493.
157. E.g. In Detroit the school system is 80% black or minority students. In
Milliken I the Court effectively precluded fully integrated schools by excluding suburban districts from the court's order. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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series of ad hoc reviews by the Supreme Court of both the violation
and the remedy in school cases. Columbus and Dayton II may remedy
this, with their renewed emphasis on the trial court's findings. Until
such time as the Court reaffirms the decision in those cases, however,
the lower courts seem to be left with a confusing doctrinal maze from
which to pick the remedies for the cases before them. As the Boston
and Cleveland cases show, their decisions may, for the most part, be
unaffected by the Supreme Court's uncertainty.
Conversely, it can be argued that the effort to defer to state
plenary powers wherever possible is a proper role for the federal
courts, in order to prevent a loss of credibility with the state and local
officials. It may be that, by limiting the lower federal courts extensive
intrustions into local government powers, the Supreme Court will
create a better atmosphere for the development by local officials of
alternative means to enforce individual liberties.
That is not to say that courts should shy away from protecting individual rights merely because protecting those rights would involve
the court in policy questions or require the court to intrude on local
powers to effect a remedy. De Tocqueville said: "Scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or
later, into a judicial question.""' While federalism may dictate
restraint on the part of the judiciary when dealing with powers traditionally viewed as plenary in local authorities, the courts must be able
to effectively remedy violations of constitutional guarantees or these
guarantees will exist only on paper. It would be ironic indeed, if the
same powers which state officials had abused in violation of the Constitution would serve as a shield against an effective remedy of those
violations.
G. Michael Kirkman
158.

A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
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